Ronald D. and Paula J. Pittman, et al. - Page 5




                                        - 5 -                                         
          filed answers on April 6, 1998.  On December 7, 1998, the Court             
          consolidated these cases for trial.                                         
               On January 14, 1999, the parties executed a stipulation of             
          facts, which was filed with the Court on February 1, 1999.                  
          Paragraph 15 of the stipulation of facts, e.g., stated as                   
          follows:                                                                    
                    Industrial Coil does not maintain an inventory of                 
               materials or completed coils.  All necessary materials                 
               are obtained locally after a determination of the                      
               specific materials needed to complete the job is made.                 
               No merchandise is held for sale to customers in the                    
               ordinary course of Industrial Coil's business.                         
               The cases were submitted fully stipulated under Rule 122 on            
          February 1, 1999.  The Court directed the parties to file opening           
          briefs on April 19, 1999, and reply briefs 45 days thereafter.              
               After respondent's District Counsel attorney prepared her              
          proposed opening brief, she sent it, along with copies of the               
          stipulation of facts and both parties' trial memoranda, to the              
          Assistant Chief Counsel (Field Service) for review before filing            
          with the Court.  The attorney in the Assistant Chief Counsel's              
          office responsible for the review opined that the use of the term           
          "merchandise" in paragraph 15 of the stipulation of facts was               
          hazardous to respondent's position because the term is "a term of           
          art in the change of accounting method regulations and opinions."           
          The attorney concluded that the wording of paragraph 15 amounted            
          to a concession of a key fact in the cases.                                 








Page:  Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  Next

Last modified: May 25, 2011