Ronald D. and Paula J. Pittman, et al. - Page 15




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          published opinion 770 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1985).  Therein, we held           
          that the Commissioner did not abuse his discretion in requiring a           
          taxpayer to use the accrual method of accounting where the                  
          taxpayer ordered materials for each job and sold custom-                    
          fabricated metal decking.  We reasoned that the taxpayer's                  
          possession, even momentarily, of title to the metal decking was             
          sufficient to require the use of inventories and the use of the             
          accrual method of accounting.                                               
               Further, respondent relied upon our holding in Thompson                
          Elec., Inc. v. Commissioner, supra, and Wilkinson-Beane, Inc. v.            
          Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1969-79, affd. 420 F.2d 352 (1st Cir.              
          1970), where we held that if the cost of material that a taxpayer           
          uses to provide a service is substantial compared to the                    
          taxpayer's receipts, the material is an income-producing factor.            
               Although we need not decide the substantive issue in these             
          cases, we think that respondent's position was sufficiently                 
          supported by the facts and circumstances in petitioners' cases              
          and the existing legal precedent.  See Pierce v. Underwood, 487             
          U.S. 552 (1988).  Respondent's position was reasonable in fact              
          because respondent reasonably inferred that IC "held" goods for             
          sale and that such goods were an income-producing factor in IC's            
          business.  Respondent's position was reasonable in law because              
          respondent reasonably relied upon existing legal precedent that,            









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