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the tax liability that will result therefrom. [H. Rept. 179,
68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924), 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 251; S.
Rept. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924), 1939-1 C.B. (Part
2) 275.]
Unlike the statutory provision at issue in Horn v.
Commissioner, 968 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1992), neither the plain
language of section 1001 nor its legislative history lends any
support to the proposition that Congress intended to respect the
tax consequences of sales or exchanges of property that lack
economic substance. While it is true that Congress crafted
section 1001 as a provision that would be broadly applicable to
sales or exchanges of property, subject to specific statutory
exceptions, Congress did not proscribe an analysis of the
economic substance of a sale or exchange of property. Cf. Compaq
Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 17 (1999) (Rejecting the
taxpayer’s argument that the foreign tax credit regime completely
sets forth Congress’ intent as to allowable foreign tax credits
and that an additional economic substance requirement was not
intended by Congress). In this regard, it is important to
recognize that the economic substance doctrine is not a
judicially created exception to the general rule of section
1001(c), as petitioner implies, but rather is a "canon of
statutory interpretation that statutes should not be read to
create 'absurd results.'" Horn v. Commissioner, supra at 1239.
Moreover, petitioner's position conflicts with long-standing
Supreme Court precedent holding that the tax consequences of
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