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          1976 change, which added section 183(e)(4), eliminated the                  
          requirement for a written agreement that generally waived the               
          statute of limitations and provided that a section 183(e)                   
          election would automatically extend the limitation period, but              
          only for "the assessment of any deficiency".  The purpose of                
          section 183(e)(4) was to narrow the scope of the extension                  
          required under prior law.  See S. Rept. 94-938 (Part I), supra at           
          67-69, 1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 3) at 105-107.  By enacting section                
          183(e)(4), Congress limited the subject matter of the new                   
          automatic extension to the "assessment of any deficiency"                   
          attributable to the activity that might be subject to section               
          183.  In Estate of Caporella v. Commissioner, supra, we explained           
          the purpose of section 183(e)(4):                                           
               Without question, the intent of Congress in amending                   
               section 183(e) was to automatically extend the period                  
               of limitations on assessment of deficiencies arising                   
               from "hobby losses" when a taxpayer elects a                           
               postponement of a profit determination.  [Id. at 296.]                 
          When it enacted section 183(e)(4), Congress made no provision for           
          extending the period of limitations for claiming a refund of an             
          overpayment.                                                                
               Where a statute appears to be clear on its face, we require            
          unequivocal evidence of legislative purpose before construing the           
          statute so as to override the plain meaning of the words used               
          therein.  Huntsberry v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 742, 747-748                  
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