- 31 - 1976 change, which added section 183(e)(4), eliminated the requirement for a written agreement that generally waived the statute of limitations and provided that a section 183(e) election would automatically extend the limitation period, but only for "the assessment of any deficiency". The purpose of section 183(e)(4) was to narrow the scope of the extension required under prior law. See S. Rept. 94-938 (Part I), supra at 67-69, 1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 3) at 105-107. By enacting section 183(e)(4), Congress limited the subject matter of the new automatic extension to the "assessment of any deficiency" attributable to the activity that might be subject to section 183. In Estate of Caporella v. Commissioner, supra, we explained the purpose of section 183(e)(4): Without question, the intent of Congress in amending section 183(e) was to automatically extend the period of limitations on assessment of deficiencies arising from "hobby losses" when a taxpayer elects a postponement of a profit determination. [Id. at 296.] When it enacted section 183(e)(4), Congress made no provision for extending the period of limitations for claiming a refund of an overpayment. Where a statute appears to be clear on its face, we require unequivocal evidence of legislative purpose before construing the statute so as to override the plain meaning of the words used therein. Huntsberry v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 742, 747-748Page: Previous 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011