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presumption regarding certain activity and gives the Commissioner
additional time to assess a deficiency regarding that activity.
Overpayment jurisdiction in this case is dependent upon the
meaning of language in statutes of limitations. Statutes of
limitation provisions are to be strictly construed in favor of
the Government. Zeier v. United States, 80 F.3d 1360, 1365 (9th
Cir. 1996). As the Supreme Court has stated:
we reject any suggestion that we elevate the 'perceived
unfairness to taxpayers' over our duty to strictly
construe in favor of the government a statute of
limitation when the petitioner seeks application of the
statute so as to bar the rights of the government.
Fehlhaber, 954 F.2d at 658." * * * [Bufferd v.
Commissioner, 506 U.S. 523, 532 (1993) (quoting Green
v. Commissioner, 963 F.2d 783, 789 (5th Cir. 1992),
affg. T.C. Memo. 1991-78).]
And as recently stated by the Supreme Court in construing the
statutory language in sections 6512(b)(3) and 6511:
We are bound by the language of the statute as it
is written, and even if the rule Lundy advocates might
"accor[d] with good policy," we are not at liberty "to
rewrite [the] statute because [we] might deem its
effects susceptible of improvement." Badaracco, supra,
at 398. Applying �6512(b)(3)(B) as Congress drafted
it, we find that the applicable look-back period in
this case is two years, measured from the date of the
mailing of the notice of deficiency. Accordingly, we
find that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to award
Lundy a refund of his overwithheld taxes. The judgment
is reversed. [Commissioner v. Lundy, 516 U.S. at 252-
253.]
More recently, in rejecting a taxpayer's attempt to infer an
equitable tolling exception into the limitations provisions of
section 6511, the Supreme Court stated:
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