Abraham Lincoln Opportunity Foundation - Page 4




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          ground that under the laws of the State of Colorado petitioner              
          does not have the capacity to engage in litigation in the Court.3           
          See Rule 60(c).                                                             
               Although respondent does not dispute petitioner’s contention           
          that under the laws of the State of Colorado petitioner “is not             
          barred from commencing this proceeding simply because its corpo-            
          rate status has been dissolved”, we do.  In advancing that                  
          contention, petitioner relies on Colo. Rev. Stat. sec. 7-114-               
          105(2)(e) (1999), which was in effect when petitioner claims it             
          dissolved in 1995 and when petitioner filed the petition in this            

               3We also find on the record before us that petitioner is not           
          interested in prosecuting, and has thus far failed to prosecute,            
          this case in order to attempt to obtain the only remedy available           
          to it under sec. 7428, i.e., a declaration with respect to                  
          petitioner’s continuing qualification as an organization de-                
          scribed in sec. 501(c)(3).  We further find on that record that             
          petitioner is not interested in pursuing its request in the                 
          petition “that this Court issue a declaratory judgment declaring            
          that Petitioner is recognized as an organization described in               
          section 501(c)(3) of the Code for the years in issue [1990                  
          through 1994]”.  Instead, petitioner asks this Court, as it did             
          in petitioner’s motion to dismiss filed on Feb. 10, 2000 (peti-             
          tioner’s Feb. 10, 2000 motion to dismiss), to order respondent to           
          annul or withdraw respondent’s notice of revocation on the ground           
          that respondent abused respondent’s discretion in issuing that              
          notice.  According to petitioner, if we were to issue an order              
          “requiring Respondent’s annulment of Petitioner’s revocation                
          letter, Petitioner will move to dismiss its own Petition.”                  
          Assuming arguendo that we were not required to dismiss this case            
          for lack of jurisdiction, what we stated in the Court’s Order               
          dated Apr. 17, 2000, denying petitioner’s Feb. 10, 2000 motion to           
          dismiss, would pertain here:  “Such summary determination [sought           
          by petitioner] cannot be made on the record.  The remedy avail-             
          able to petitioner in the event that respondent abused his                  
          discretion in issuing the notice of revocation is a declaratory             
          judgment as sought in the original petition.”                               






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