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bankruptcy proceeding, it is clear that we do have jurisdiction
to determine whether we lack jurisdiction because of the
continuance of an automatic stay. See Moody v. Commissioner, 95
T.C. 655, 658 (1990). If the stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section
362(a)(8) had been in effect on December 22, 1998, the date on
which petitioner filed a petition, the Tax Court would not have
jurisdiction. The record, however, reflects that the order of
Discharge of Debtor was entered by the bankruptcy court on July
18, 1994, and terminated the stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section
362(c)(2)(C).
Petitioner’s contention that the automatic stay continues
until the property is no longer property of the bankruptcy
estate, at which time the bankruptcy proceeding is completely
closed, is based on 11 U.S.C. section 362(c)(1). However, the
proceedings before us fall under 11 U.S.C. section 362(c)(2)(C),
wherein the stay of “any other act” is lifted upon order of
discharge in a chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. The proceeding
before us is not an act against the property of the bankruptcy
estate per 11 U.S.C. section 362(c)(1). See Bigelow v.
Commissioner, 65 F.3d 127, 128 (9th Cir. 1995).
We therefore find that the automatic stay ended with the
entry of the July 18, 1994, order of Discharge of Debtor. Since
petitioner filed his petition with this Court on December 22,
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