- 7 - bankruptcy proceeding, it is clear that we do have jurisdiction to determine whether we lack jurisdiction because of the continuance of an automatic stay. See Moody v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 655, 658 (1990). If the stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section 362(a)(8) had been in effect on December 22, 1998, the date on which petitioner filed a petition, the Tax Court would not have jurisdiction. The record, however, reflects that the order of Discharge of Debtor was entered by the bankruptcy court on July 18, 1994, and terminated the stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section 362(c)(2)(C). Petitioner’s contention that the automatic stay continues until the property is no longer property of the bankruptcy estate, at which time the bankruptcy proceeding is completely closed, is based on 11 U.S.C. section 362(c)(1). However, the proceedings before us fall under 11 U.S.C. section 362(c)(2)(C), wherein the stay of “any other act” is lifted upon order of discharge in a chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. The proceeding before us is not an act against the property of the bankruptcy estate per 11 U.S.C. section 362(c)(1). See Bigelow v. Commissioner, 65 F.3d 127, 128 (9th Cir. 1995). We therefore find that the automatic stay ended with the entry of the July 18, 1994, order of Discharge of Debtor. Since petitioner filed his petition with this Court on December 22,Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Next
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