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adjustments with respect to 1989 through 1991 affect petitioner’s
tax liability for 1992. What is clear is that after taking into
account all of the various adjustments stipulated by the parties,
the deficiency for 1992 was increased and that petitioner became
entitled to a refund only as a result of the carryback from
1993.7 Thus, petitioner has not established that he prevailed
with respect to any of the issues for the year before the Court.
It also appears that petitioner did not substantially
prevail with respect to at least one of the issues raised in the
amended petition. The record indicates that petitioner initially
claimed that his tax liability for 1992 should be determined by
allowing a deduction for a charitable contribution in the amount
of $405,000. In the parties’ stipulations, however, petitioner
conceded that he was only entitled to a charitable contribution
deduction in the amount of $40,000. Petitioner can hardly be
said to have substantially prevailed with respect to that issue.
7 Given these facts, we also note that respondent’s
position was substantially justified. Petitioner became entitled
to a refund as a result of a carryback from 1993 only after he
filed amended returns for those years and provided additional
documentation to support his claim. In this regard, respondent
could not have been expected to ferret out all conceivable
carrybacks when determining petitioner’s tax liability for the
year in issue. See Clayton v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-327,
affd. 181 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 1998). Nor could respondent have
been expected to accept petitioner’s claim to a carryback without
substantiating documentation. See Sokol v. Commissioner, 92 T.C.
760, 765 n.10 (1989), Sher v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 79, 87
(1987), affd. 861 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1988); Ellison v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-741.
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