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order was for the benefit of the plaintiff’s attorney.
Id. at 118.
Although the Supreme Court of Oklahoma has not addressed the
narrow legal issue presented in the instant case, the cases cited
above, particularly Kelly v. Maupin, supra, lend support to
respondent’s position that petitioner would have remained liable
for the payment of attorney’s fees, either to representatives of
Mrs. Berry’s estate or directly to Mrs. Berry’s attorney, had
Mrs. Berry died before entry of a final divorce decree by the
State court. Kelly v. Maupin, supra, suggests that the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma considers the award of attorney’s fees to have
continuing viability regardless of the status of the underlying
divorce action.
We note that the majority of State courts considering this
question have concluded that an award of attorney’s fees remains
viable and enforceable notwithstanding the death of one spouse
before entry of a final divorce decree. See Stackhouse v.
Stackhouse, 484 N.W.2d 723 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Centazzo v.
Centazzo, 556 A.2d 560 (R.I. 1989); Hirsch v. Hirsch, 519 So.2d
1056 (Fla. Dist. App. 1988); State ex rel. Paxton v. Porter
Superior Court, 467 N.E.2d 1205 (Ind. 1984); Williams v.
Williams, 281 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1971); Spiro v. Spiro, 260 N.E.2d
332 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970); Gunther v. Gunther, 301 S.W.2d 207
(Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Briggs v. Briggs, 1 S.E.2d 118 (N.C.
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