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1939); Ballard v. Caperton, 59 Ky. 412 (Ky. 1859); see also
Zinsmeister v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-364 (interpreting
Minnesota law); Smith v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-166
(interpreting Georgia law). But cf. Hogsett v. Hogsett, 409
S.W.2d 232 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966); Greer v. Greer, 130 P.2d 1050
(Colo. 1942).
Courts upholding the viability of awards of attorney’s fees
frequently focus on the public policy underlying the statutory
provisions authorizing such awards; i.e., providing otherwise
needy spouses with the means to retain counsel in divorce
actions. See Stackhouse v. Stackhouse, supra at 726; Williams v.
Williams, supra at 275-276. Such courts point out that a
spouse’s access to counsel would be unduly restricted if counsel
were required to bear the risk that his or her client might not
survive until a final divorce decree is entered. On the other
hand, courts holding that awards of attorney’s fees in divorce
proceedings do not survive the death of a spouse merely seek to
impose a bright line rule that such awards abate with the death
of a spouse before the entry of a divorce decree.
Considering Oklahoma case law, as well as the policy
underlying awards of attorney’s fees in divorce actions, we
conclude that the Supreme Court of Oklahoma would hold that
petitioner would remain liable for the attorney’s fees that the
State court awarded to Mrs. Berry in 1996 even if Mrs. Berry had
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