Donald DeCleene and Doris DeCleene - Page 25

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          Drive property while title was parked with WLC does not gainsay             
          our conclusion.  In substance, petitioner never disposed of the             
          Lawrence Drive property and remained its owner during the 3-month           
          construction period because the transfer of title to WLC never              
          divested petitioner of beneficial ownership.                                
               Having set forth our analysis and conclusion, we now address           
          the authorities cited by petitioners6 as favoring their position            
          or as being distinguishable.                                                
          Authority in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit                   
               The only case in the Seventh Circuit--the circuit to which             
          any appeal would lie in the case at hand--that the parties have             

          6 Petitioners contend that their advisers relied on two                     
          private letter rulings in structuring the subject transactions:             
          Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-23-035 (Mar. 9, 1978), which they characterize           
          as “nearly identical to the facts in our case”, and Priv. Ltr.              
          Rul. 91-49-018 (Sept. 4, 1991), which they cite as “virtually               
          directly on point (even goes farther than our case) on how a                
          transaction can be structured”.  Petitioners’ contentions are               
          unavailing; not only does sec. 6110(j)(3) provide that private              
          letter rulings cannot be cited as precedent, but, unlike the case           
          at hand, the other  party to the transaction in both private                
          letter rulings had the risks of ownership during the relevant               
          time period.  Similarly, Rev. Rul. 75-291, 1975-2 C.B. 333, and             
          Rev. Rul. 77-297, 1977-2 C.B. 304, cited in Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-             
          23-035, don’t help petitioners; not only does this Court regard             
          published rulings as having no precedential value, see Estate of            
          Lang v. Commissioner, 613 F.2d 770, 776 (9th Cir. 1980), affg. on           
          this issue 64 T.C. 404, 406-407 (1975); Intel Corp. & Consol.               
          Subs. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 616, 621 (1993); Stark v.                   
          Commissioner,86 T.C. 243, 250-251 (1986), but the facts of both             
          rulings, like Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-94-018 (Sept. 4, 1991), are                
          distinguishable from the case at hand in the same dispositive               

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