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189 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1951), on the ground that “It was clear
that the contractor did not own the other property which, it was
claimed, was transferred to the taxpayer in the exchange.” As
already indicated, we have found dispositive in the case at hand
that WLC never acquired beneficial ownership of the Lawrence
Drive property.8 WLC merely served as an accommodation party,
providing the parking place for legal title to the Lawrence Drive
property, while petitioner remained the beneficial owner before
and after and throughout the 3-month focal period of the subject
transactions.
When petitioner conveyed to WLC title to the Lawrence Drive
property, WLC became contractually bound to reconvey it, and
petitioner was bound to take it back, prior to yearend (not much
more than 3 months). Indeed, under Wisconsin law, both parties
were entitled to specific performance of the other party’s
obligation. See Anderson v. Onsager, 455 N.W.2d 885 (Wis. 1990);
Heins v. Thompson & Flieth L. Co., 163 N.W. 173 (Wis. 1917).
It’s difficult to imagine commitments more binding than the
reciprocal obligations of petitioner and WLC in the case at hand.
The conveyance and reconveyance of title to the Lawrence Drive
8 We also observe that J.H. Baird Publg. Co. v.
Commissioner, 39 T.C. 608, 618 (1962), on which petitioners rely,
applied the concept of beneficial ownership in the taxpayer’s
favor. Petitioners have failed to persuade us that the concept
of beneficial ownership is an illegitimate importation into the
tax law of qualified like-kind exchanges.
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