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provisions of States that have been distinguished from the
attorney lien provisions of Alabama. See Baylin v. Commissioner,
43 F.3d 1451, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding Maryland attorney
lien statute does not give attorney an ownership interest in
claim of his or her client); Estate of Gadlow v. Commissioner, 50
T.C. 975, 979-980 (1968) (Pennsylvania law distinguishable from
Alabama statute); Petersen v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 137, 151-152
(1962) (holding Nebraska attorney lien statute distinguishable
from Alabama attorney lien statute); Coady v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1998-291 (Alaska attorney lien statute distinguishable from
Alabama statute).
Petitioner next contends that Missouri law provides the same
attorney lien priority as does Alabama law. In Cotnam, the court
interpreted Alabama law as providing an attorney lien with a
superior priority over the defendant’s set-off right against the
plaintiff. See Cotnam v. Commissioner, supra at 125. Petitioner
relies on Hillside Enters., Inc. v. Carlisle Corp., 944 F. Supp.
793, 802 (E.D. Mo. 1996), for the proposition that Missouri case
law has recognized the same superior attorney lien priority
concept as stated in Cotnam. The District Court’s decision in
Hillside, however, was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit in Hillside Enters., Inc. v. Continental Carlisle,
Inc., 147 F.3d 732 (8th Cir. 1998). In reversing, the Court of
Appeals concluded that the lower court’s holding regarding the
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