- 15 - provisions of States that have been distinguished from the attorney lien provisions of Alabama. See Baylin v. Commissioner, 43 F.3d 1451, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding Maryland attorney lien statute does not give attorney an ownership interest in claim of his or her client); Estate of Gadlow v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 975, 979-980 (1968) (Pennsylvania law distinguishable from Alabama statute); Petersen v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 137, 151-152 (1962) (holding Nebraska attorney lien statute distinguishable from Alabama attorney lien statute); Coady v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-291 (Alaska attorney lien statute distinguishable from Alabama statute). Petitioner next contends that Missouri law provides the same attorney lien priority as does Alabama law. In Cotnam, the court interpreted Alabama law as providing an attorney lien with a superior priority over the defendant’s set-off right against the plaintiff. See Cotnam v. Commissioner, supra at 125. Petitioner relies on Hillside Enters., Inc. v. Carlisle Corp., 944 F. Supp. 793, 802 (E.D. Mo. 1996), for the proposition that Missouri case law has recognized the same superior attorney lien priority concept as stated in Cotnam. The District Court’s decision in Hillside, however, was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Hillside Enters., Inc. v. Continental Carlisle, Inc., 147 F.3d 732 (8th Cir. 1998). In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that the lower court’s holding regarding thePage: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011