Eldon R. Kenseth and Susan M. Kenseth - Page 33




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         was not then regarded as serious.  That is, we held that the                   
         taxpayers in O’Brien v. Commissioner, supra, and in Cotnam v.                  
         Commissioner, 28 T.C. 947 (1957), revd. on this issue and affd.                
         on other issues 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959), were entitled to                 
         some but not all of the relief they claimed from the general                   
         application of the annual accounting period rules.8                            
              However, as the majority opinion notes (majority op. pp. 13-              
         15), continued application of the court-made rules, in this era                
         of minimum tax can raise effective tax rates to hardship levels                


               8The statute referred to in O’Brien v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.             
          707, 710 (1962), affd. 319 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1963), is sec. 1303,             
          I.R.C. 1954, which provided a “cap” on taxation of back-pay                   
          awards, calculated by “spreading back” the award over the years               
          to which the awarded amounts were attributable.  We held that the             
          gross award was to be spread back, unreduced by the taxpayer’s                
          costs of obtaining the award.  We noted that the taxpayer merely              
          was being denied a special, limited relief from the normal                    
          incidences of income taxation, and that he remained entitled to               
          deduct his legal fees for the year the award was made.  See                   
          O’Brien v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. at 710, 712.  In O’Brien v.                  
          Commissioner, 38 T.C. at 711, we relied on Smith v. Commissioner,             
          17 T.C. 135 (1951), revd. on another issue 203 F.2d 310 (2d Cir.              
          1953), in which we had ruled the same way under sec. 107(d),                  
          I.R.C. 1939, the predecessor of sec. 1303, I.R.C. 1954.  In Smith             
          v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. at 144, the taxpayer wanted the gross                
          award spread back and the expenses deducted for the year of the               
          award, while the Commissioner argued for spreading back the net               
          cost; we held for the taxpayer.  In Cotnam v. Commissioner, 28                
          T.C. 947, 953-954 (1957), revd. on this issue and affd. on other              
          issues 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959), we also held that the gross              
          award was to be spread back under sec. 107(d), I.R.C. 1939, and               
          the expenses deductible for the year of the award.                            
               The spread-back provisions that were the foundations for                 
          Smith, Cotnam, and O’Brien were repealed by the Revenue Act of                
          1964, Pub. L. 88-272, sec. 232(a), 78 Stat. 19, 105, effective                
          for taxable years beginning after Dec. 31, 1963.  See Pub. L. 88-             
          272, sec. 232(g)(1), 78 Stat. 112.                                            





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