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BEGHE, J., dissenting: As presiding judge at the trial of
this case, my disagreement with the majority is neither a dispute
about evidentiary facts nor a doctrinal dispute as such. What
divides me from the majority--notwithstanding the majority have
adopted my proposed factual findings pretty much verbatim--is a
disagreement about the significance of those facts. In my view,
those facts do not call for application of the assignment of
income doctrine.
The recitals and reasoning in support of my efforts to
decide this case in favor of petitioners go on and on at such
length that I provide a Table of Contents.
Findings and Resulting Inferences .............. 39
Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1. Issue Is Ripe for Reexamination .......... 44
2. Tax Court’s Jurisprudence on Tax Treatment of
Contingent Fees--Dicta for Case at Hand ..... 48
3. Another Reason for Reexamination: Repeal of
Statutory Spreadback and Averaging Provisions .. 54
4. Cotnam and Estate of Clarks ............ 56
i. Narrow Ground--Significance of State Law .. 60
ii. Broader Ground--Federal Standard ...... 66
5. Significance of Control in Supreme Court’s
Assignment of Income Jurisprudence ........ 70
6. Substantial Reduction of Claimant’s Control
by Contingent Fee Agreement ........... 75
i. “Contract of Adhesion” ........... 76
ii. American Bar Foundation Contingent
Fee Study ................. 77
iii. “Two Keys” Simile .............. 80
7. Omissions and Distortions: the Majority Opinion .. 82
8. Majority Opinion’s Handling of Authorities ..... 86
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