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are for disciplinary purposes; they are not supposed to affect
the substantive legal rights of lawyers and are not designed to
be a basis for civil liability.39
The Wisconsin courts have recognized the tension between the
client’s rights to terminate representation and the attorney’s
rights under contingent fee agreements and the statutory lien.
See Goldman v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 126 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1964),
cited by respondent and the majority for the proposition that the
claim belongs to the client, not the attorney. However, what
Goldman actually said was more balanced:
it is not against public policy for a client to settle
his claim with the tortfeasor or his insurer without
participation and consent of the attorney before action
is commenced even though the client has retained
counsel. * * * The claim belongs to the client and
not the attorney; the client has the right to
compromise or even abandon his claim if he sees fit to
do so. * * *
We do not hold by inference that a contract
between client and attorney whereby the attorney is to
control the procedure of the prosecution of the claim,
nor that an agreement for a lien upon the cause of
action for attorney’s fees is against public policy
and, therefore, void. On the contrary, by virtue of
the attorney lien statutes and the common law we
recognize their validity. [Id. at 5.]
39 Compare Estate of Newhouse v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 193,
232-233 (1990), regarding effect on valuation of a right of the
necessity of bringing a lawsuit to enforce it; presence of such
uncertainty equates with a reduction in claimant-assignor’s
degree of control; see also Estate of Mueller v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1992-284, on effects of threatened litigation on
possible nonconsumation of a stock acquisition as affecting value
of the stock.
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