Eldon R. Kenseth and Susan M. Kenseth - Page 59




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              This is the narrow holding of the Court of Appeals’ decision              
         in Cotnam, discussed below in subpart i.34                                     
              There then followed a statement of the broader ground of the              
         panel’s decision, introduced by the following statement: “Judges               
         RIVES and BROWN add to the foregoing, the following”, 263 F.2d at              
         125, and concluding:  “Accordingly, the attorneys’ fee of                      
         $50,365.83 should not have been included in the taxpayer’s gross               
         income”, 263 F.2d at 126.  Then came the dissenting opinion of                 
         Judge Wisdom, who had written the opinion for the panel embodying              
         the narrow holding.35  The disagreement between the additional                 


               34 Although the Tax Court noted that the attorneys “only had             
          a lien on the fund” payable to Mrs. Cotnam and that the attorneys             
          “had no right in or title to” Mrs. Cotnam’s recovery sufficient               
          to justify treating them as the owners for tax purposes of any                
          portion of that recovery, it is not clear that the peculiar                   
          provisions of Alabama law that provided the narrow holding of the             
          Court of Appeals decision were brought to the attention of the                
          Tax Court.  See Cotnam v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 947, 954 (1957),              
          affd. in part and revd. in part 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959).                 
          The Tax Court, in sustaining the Commissioner’s treatment of the              
          fee as a deduction, did not address the significance (or even                 
          advert to the existence) of those provisions (discussed infra pp.             
          60-66).                                                                       
               35 Cotnam is a close-to-home example of a judge (Wisdom, J.)             
          writing both the majority opinion and a dissent.  Although only               
          rarely does the judge who writes the majority opinion also write              
          separately in concurrence or dissent, it has happened in this                 
          Court, Haserot v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 864, 872-878 (1966)                   
          (Tannenwald, J., “speaking separately”), affd. sub nom.                       
          Commissioner v. Stickney, 399 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1968), and in                
          other courts, see, e.g. City of Baton Rouge v. Ross, 654 So.2d                
          1311, 1326 (La. 1995) (Calogero, C.J., concurring); Santa Clara               
          County Local Transp. Auth. v. Guardino, 902 P.2d 225, 256 (Cal.               
          1995) (Werdegar, J. dissenting); Dawkins v. Dawkins, 328 P.2d                 
          346, 353 (Kan. 1958) (Jackson, J., concurring), no less than the              
                                                               (continued...)           





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