Theron R. Livingston, Sr. - Page 14




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          at 121, we believe that the 1989 net worth computation is so                  
          unreliable as to negate any presumption of correctness.  As in                
          Jacobs v. Commissioner, supra, with regard to taxable year 1989,              
          respondent has failed to “show the correct amount of petitioner’s             
          reconstructed taxable income or [to] provide any basis for                    
          estimating it.”  See also Gallo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-             
          367.  Accordingly, this issue is decided for petitioner husband.              
          Respondent’s 1990 Income Reconstruction for Petitioners                       
               For taxable year 1990, by his criminal plea petitioner                   
          husband explicitly admitted that he had unreported income of                  
          $63,610, as determined by respondent’s 1990 criminal net worth                
          calculation, which was predicated on an opening net worth of                  
          $4,845.  Petitioner did not appear at trial to refute his prior               
          admission.  Cf. Toushin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-171.                 
               Petitioner husband’s admission is strong evidence of the                 
          validity of the 1990 criminal net worth computation, and                      
          consequently of the 1990 civil net worth computation, which was               
          derived directly therefrom.  Petitioner husband’s admission in                
          the criminal proceeding does not collaterally estop him, however,             
          from challenging the specific deficiency amount in this                       
          proceeding, because “the determination of an exact liability was              
          not essential to the judgment, a prerequisite to the application              
          of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.”  Moore v. United States,             
          360 F.2d 353, 356 (4th Cir. 1965) (internal quotation marks                   





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