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separate households at the time the payment is made, (5) the
former spouses do not file a joint return, and (6) the liability
for payment does not continue for any period after the former
spouse’s death. See sec. 71(b)(1), (e). Each of these
requirements must be met before a payor may deduct a payment as
alimony. The parties dispute only two of these requirements;
namely, the third and sixth requirements set forth above.
We begin our analysis with the third requirement under which
a payment is not treated as alimony if the divorce or separation
instrument designates that the payment is not includable in the
recipient’s income under section 71 or deductible by the payor
under section 215. See sec. 71(b)(1)(B). The instrument must
contain a clear and explicit designation to that effect although
it need not refer expressly to section 71 or section 215. See
Estate of Goldman v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 317, 323-324 (1999);
see also Richardson v. Commissioner, 125 F.3d 551, 556 (7th Cir.
1997), affg. T.C. Memo. 1995-554.
Here, we construe the Virginia decree and the Illinois order
as designating the payment in question as nonalimony. The
Virginia decree provides explicitly that petitioner and Ms.
Maloney shall “both be denied spousal support.” The Illinois
order provides explicitly that petitioner’s transfer of the
$47,900 to Ms. Maloney “shall not be considered a taxable event.”
The Virginia decree and the Illinois order, therefore, designate
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