Anthony J. McCarthy - Page 13




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            facts, we find that the prospect for profit in this case was too                           
            remote and inconsequential to outweigh the immediate personal                              
            nature of the activity.  Thus, the primary motivation of                                   
            petitioner in participating in the motocross racing with his son                           
            was personal, not for profit.                                                              
                  This factor favors respondent.                                                       
                  Having fully considered the above-enumerated factors and                             
            taking into account all of the relevant facts and circumstances,                           
            we reaffirm our previous holding in McCarthy I that petitioner in                          
            1993 did not engage in managing Benjamin's motocross racing with                           
            the intent to make a profit which is necessary to establish the                            
            management activity as a trade or business within the intendment                           
            of section 162(a).  Cf. Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23,                          
            35 (1987).                                                                                 
            Additional Considerations                                                                  
                  In its mandate remanding this case to the Court for further                          
            consideration, the Court of Appeals instructed us, as follows:                             
                        In addition, the Tax Court should consider the                                 
                  relevance to this matter, if any, of the "pre-opening                                
                  expense" doctrine.  The "pre-opening expense" doctrine                               
                  requires that expenses incurred before a taxpayer                                    
                  begins business operations be capitalized rather than                                
                  deducted in the year at issue.  See, e.g., Sorrell v.                                
                  Commissioner, 882 F.2d 484, 486 (11th Cir. 1989);                                    
                  Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d                                 
                  901, 905-07 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 382                                
                  U.S. 68 (1965) (per curiam).  We ask for consideration                               
                  of this doctrine, or a determination that it is                                      
                  irrelevant, because it was mentioned in the                                          
                  Commissioner's brief on this appeal.  See Appellee's                                 
                  Br. at 26 n.7.                                                                       





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