MidAmerican Energy Company - Page 27




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            from the facts of the cases at hand, combined to persuade the                              
            District Court in Dominion Resources that the refunds were more                            
            like deductible expenses than future rate reductions.                                      
                  Our holding is also consistent with our prior opinion in                             
            Andrews v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-668.  In Andrews, a                               
            taxpayer, injured while on the job, received excess disability                             
            payments from Met Life, her insurance carrier, while she was                               
            involved in a legal action with the Social Security                                        
            Administration to receive benefits.  The payments were made                                
            subject to the condition that, if the taxpayer won her dispute                             
            and was awarded funds for past Social Security benefits, the                               
            taxpayer would refund the excess disability payments to the                                
            insurance company.  The taxpayer won her legal action and                                  
            satisfied her refund obligation by setting off her liability to                            
            Met Life against future ordinary disability payments to which she                          
            was entitled from Met Life.  This Court denied section 1341                                
            relief, stating that the taxpayer’s return of funds by means of a                          
            setoff would not qualify as a deduction because:                                           
                  there has been no “restoration”, i.e., nothing has been                              
                  repaid to Met Life by Mrs. Andrews.  We reject the                                   
                  contention that, under these facts, there can be a                                   
                  constructive restoration when no actual repayment is                                 
                  made.                                                                                
                        In 1987, Mrs. Andrews received all the Social                                  
                  Security payments to which she had been entitled for                                 
                  the years 1983 through 1986.  At that point, Met Life                                
                  had paid Mrs. Andrews more than it was obligated to                                  
                  pay, and reduced its payments to her in subsequent                                   
                  years until it had setoff its obligation to                                          





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