Vernon Miller - Page 11




                                               - 11 -                                                  
            year in which there is no reasonable prospect of recovering the                            
            loan.  See Aston v. Commissioner, supra; Crown v. Commissioner,                            
            77 T.C. 582, 598 (1981).  The determination of worthlessness must                          
            be fixed by identifiable events which form the basis of reason-                            
            able grounds for abandoning any hope of recovery.  See Aston v.                            
            Commissioner, supra; Crown v. Commissioner, supra.                                         
                  Based on our examination of the entire record before us, we                          
            find that petitioner has failed to establish that the $2,641 of                            
            unrecovered principal of the Miller loan became worthless during                           
            1993.  We find on that record that petitioner has failed to show                           
            any identifiable events which could have formed the basis of                               
            reasonable grounds for abandoning any hope of recovering that                              
            amount.  In fact, the record establishes that petitioner contin-                           
            ued to prosecute the Miller loan lawsuit after 1993 in order to                            
            recover the balance due on the Miller loan and the legal expendi-                          
            tures that he had incurred in connection with recovering the                               
            Miller loan.  As a result of that lawsuit, petitioner was enti-                            
            tled to recover the entire $75,000 principal of the Miller loan                            
            (with offsets of $72,358.88 attributable to the amount of that                             
            principal that he recovered as of 1991), and on or about March 3,                          
            1998, he was awarded $208,206 in attorney’s fees incurred in                               
            connection with his litigation relating to that loan.  On the                              
            record before us, we hold that petitioner is not entitled to                               
            nonbusiness bad debt treatment under section 166(d) with respect                           






Page:  Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  Next

Last modified: May 25, 2011