- 62 -
FOLEY, J., dissenting: The majority highlights the
anomalous results, gaps in the application of the statutory
scheme, and tax policy concerns if section 6229(d) does not
suspend the section 6501 period of limitations. If the statute
needs repair we are not charged with the responsibility of fixing
it. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Westgate Partners, Ltd., 937
F.2d 526, 531 (10th Cir. 1991)(stating that it is the function of
the legislative branch, not the judicial branch, to make the
laws). The majority states that the statutory regime is
“distressingly complex” and “not a model of clarity”, yet
exacerbates this ostensible problem by forcing section 6501, an
inapplicable provision, into section 6229(a). Where a statute is
clear on its face, we require unequivocal evidence of legislative
purpose before construing the statute so as to override the plain
meaning of the words used therein. See Huntsberry v.
Commissioner, 83 T.C. 742, 747-748 (1984). There is no such
evidence of legislative purpose.
Section 6229(a) and (d) does not reference the section 6501
limitations period. The “period specified in subsection (a)”,
referenced by subsection (d), is the 3-year period expiring on
the later of the date the partnership return is filed, or the
last day for filing such return. The statute and legislative
history do not support the majority’s holding.
Page: Previous 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011