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introduce evidence that is within his or her control gives rise
to a presumption that the evidence, if provided, would be
unfavorable to the party who has control over the evidence. See
O'Dwyer v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 575, 584 (4th Cir. 1959), affg.
28 T.C. 698 (1957); Cluck v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 324, 338
(1995); Wichita Terminal Elevator Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C.
1158, 1165 (1946), affd. 162 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1947).
Accordingly, we find that petitioners did not establish
satisfactorily that the loans to shareholder accounts depicted on
Mid-Nebraska’s books when it ceased its business resulted from
erroneous bookkeeping entries or constituted compensation. See
Hash v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 248, 250-251 (4th Cir. 1959),
affg. T.C. Memo. 1959-96; Allen v. Commissioner, 117 F.2d 364,
368 (1st Cir. 1941), affg. a Memorandum Opinion of this Court;
see also Bartel v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 25 (1970).
Petitioners contend additionally, in essence, that even if
the bookkeeping entries on Mid-Nebraska’s books showing loans to
petitioner were accurate, the loans to shareholder accounts no
longer existed in 1993 when the State of Nebraska statutorily
dissolved Mid-Nebraska. According to petitioners, loans to
shareholders constitute accounts receivable, and York acquired
all of Mid-Nebraska’s accounts receivable during 1992; therefore,
petitioners contend, Mid-Nebraska had no asset consisting of
loans to shareholders to distribute to petitioner when the State
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