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See id. However, respondent seeks to exclude the comparable land
on the basis of one factor and one factor only (the age of the
leases--which is not even one of the factors enumerated in the
regulations).
Neither the statute nor the regulations support respondent’s
position in that respect. In this case, the parties stipulated
that the typical timber lease in effect in western Alabama
between 1987 and 1991 was entered into in the 1950's, 1960's, and
early 1970's and was a long-term timber lease. Respondent’s
argument would exclude every lease executed before August 19,
1987, which would effectively operate to prevent estates in
Alabama from using section 2032A(e)(7) to value timberland since
the typical timber lease in effect in western Alabama between
1987 and 1991 was entered into in the 1950's, 1960's, and early
1970's.
Respondent has submitted an original and two rebuttal
reports from his expert, Richard Maloy. Mr. Maloy contends that,
"Comparable leases must have been negotiated under recent (5-year
period of analysis) dates to ensure comparability of economic
conditions." Mr. Maloy is simply parroting respondent's primary
legal argument that would inject an arbitrary requirement for
application of section 2032A(e)(7)--that is, as a matter of law
no lease can be considered unless it was executed within 5 years
of the date of death. We have stated before, in Alumax v.
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