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such facts should not be stipulated. Said facts were deemed to
be admitted as a sanction for petitioner’s failure to comply with
the Court’s order, dated December 16, 1996.
This Court is a court of limited jurisdiction. See Naftel
v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 527, 529 (1985). Two of petitioner’s
claims fall outside that jurisdiction. Actions under the Privacy
Act, codified as 5 U.S.C. 552a (1994), and pursuant to section
7435 are both properly brought in U.S. District Courts. See
Crowell v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 683, 693 (1994) (“The exclusive
remedy for individuals seeking redress for a violation of the
Privacy Act is a civil action in Federal District Court pursuant
to 5 U.S.C. section 552a(g)(1)”.); sec. 7435 (taxpayer must bring
section 7435 action in a district court and “Such civil action
shall be the exclusive remedy for recovering damages”). We do
not have the authority to address these claims.
Petitioner also contends that he was injured by respondent’s
alleged failure to meet a burden of production under section 6201
when respondent did not produce a requested Form 1099 discussed
during the audit. Assuming that respondent ever had such a
burden, the document was related only to the 1991 deficiency,
which respondent has conceded.
Petitioner’s only remaining claim of injury is that the
deficiency notice was the result of an audit that was not
substantially justified. This allegation stems from petitioner’s
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