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The regulations at issue here are interpretative regulations
promulgated under the general authority vested in the Secretary
by section 7805(a). Hence, while entitled to considerable
weight, they are accorded less deference than would be
legislative regulations issued under a specific grant of
authority to address a matter raised by the pertinent statute.
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-844 (1984) (Chevron); United States v.
Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982). A legislative
regulation is to be upheld unless “arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., supra at 843-844.
With respect to interpretative regulations, the appropriate
standard is whether the provision “‘implement[s] the
congressional mandate in some reasonable manner.’” United States
v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., supra at 24 (quoting United States v.
Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967)). In applying this test, we
look to the following two-part analysis enunciated by the Supreme
Court:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of
the statute which it administers, it is confronted with
two questions. First, always, is the question whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its
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