Audrey J. Walton - Page 14

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               The regulations at issue here are interpretative regulations           
          promulgated under the general authority vested in the Secretary             
          by section 7805(a).  Hence, while entitled to considerable                  
          weight, they are accorded less deference than would be                      
          legislative regulations issued under a specific grant of                    
          authority to address a matter raised by the pertinent statute.              
          See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,              
          Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-844 (1984) (Chevron); United States v.              
          Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982).  A legislative                
          regulation is to be upheld unless “arbitrary, capricious, or                
          manifestly contrary to the statute.”  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.               
          Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., supra at 843-844.                  
               With respect to interpretative regulations, the appropriate            
          standard is whether the provision “‘implement[s] the                        
          congressional mandate in some reasonable manner.’” United States            
          v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., supra at 24 (quoting United States v.              
          Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967)).  In applying this test, we              
          look to the following two-part analysis enunciated by the Supreme           
                    When a court reviews an agency’s construction of                  
               the statute which it administers, it is confronted with                
               two questions.  First, always, is the question whether                 
               Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at                
               issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the                
               end of the matter; for the court, as well as the                       
               agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed                
               intent of Congress.  If, however, the court determines                 
               Congress has not directly addressed the precise                        
               question at issue, the court does not simply impose its                

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