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the burden of proof on that issue.
Petitioners’ Reliance on Facts Found in
Barmes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-254
In support of their position regarding the depreciation
deductions at issue, it appears that petitioners are arguing that
under the doctrine of collateral estoppel the Court is required
to find as facts in this case the facts that we found in Barmes
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-254. Barmes involved, inter
alia, petitioners’ claim to Schedule C depreciation deductions
for 1994 with respect to petitioners’ two automobiles, which we
rejected. The instant case involves, inter alia, petitioners’
claim to Schedule C depreciation deductions for 1995 with respect
to those same two automobiles.
In Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948), the Supreme
Court examined and discussed the doctrine of collateral estoppel
as it applies in Federal income tax cases. The Supreme Court
stated in pertinent part:
Income taxes are levied on an annual basis. Each year
is the origin of a new liability and of a separate
cause of action. Thus if a claim of liability or non-
liability relating to a particular tax year is liti-
gated, a judgment on the merits is res judicata as to
any subsequent proceeding involving the same claim and
the same tax year. But if the later proceeding is
concerned with a similar or unlike claim relating to a
different tax year, the prior judgment acts as a col-
lateral estoppel only as to those matters in the second
proceeding which were actually presented and determined
in the first suit. Collateral estoppel operates, in
other words, to relieve the government and the taxpayer
of “redundant litigation of the identical question of
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