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the statute’s application to the taxpayer’s status.”
* * *
* * * * * * *
* * * where two cases involve income taxes in
different taxable years, collateral estoppel must be
used with its limitations carefully in mind so as to
avoid injustice. It must be confined to situations
where the matter raised in the second suit is identical
in all respects with that decided in the first proceed-
ing and where the controlling facts and applicable
legal rules remain unchanged. * * *
Id. at 598-600.
We reject petitioners’ apparent attempt to rely on the
doctrine of collateral estoppel to require us to find as facts in
this case the facts that we found in Barmes v. Commissioner,
supra. Any such attempt misconstrues and misapplies that doc-
trine. In determining here whether petitioners are entitled to
the depreciation deductions that they are claiming for 1995 with
respect to petitioners’ two automobiles, we are in no way bound
by the facts that we found in Barmes. In resolving the deprecia-
tion issue presented to us, we shall rely on the facts that we
have found are established by the record in this case, and not by
the facts that we found in Barmes were established by the record
in that case.
Respondent’s Determination Regarding
Petitioners’ Claimed Schedule C Gross Receipts
During respondent’s examination of petitioners’ 1995 joint
return, petitioners refused to provide respondent’s revenue agent
with any books, records, or other information with respect to the
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