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taxpayers did not have any items of tax preference for the
taxable year in issue. See Klaassen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1998-241, affd. without published opinion 182 F.3d 932 (10th Cir.
1999). The same result applies in the present case.
If Congress had intended to tax only tax preferences, it
would have defined “alternative minimum taxable income”
differently, for example, solely by reference to items of tax
preference. Instead, Congress provided for a tax measured by a
broader base, namely, alternative minimum taxable income, in
which tax preferences are merely included as potential
components.
Absent some constitutional defect, we are constrained to
apply the law as written, see Estate of Cowser v. Commissioner,
736 F.2d 1168, 1171-1174 (7th Cir. 1984), affg. 80 T.C. 783, 787-
788 (1983), and we may not rewrite the law because we may “deem
its effects susceptible of improvement”, Commissioner v. Lundy,
516 U.S. 235, 252 (1996) (quoting Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464
U.S. 386, 398 (1984)). Accordingly, petitioner’s appeal for
relief must, in this instance, be addressed to his elected
representatives. “The proper place for a consideration of
petitioner’s complaint is the halls of Congress, not here.” Hays
Corp. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 436, 443 (1963), affd. 331 F.2d
422 (7th Cir. 1964).
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