Ross Gable Cansino and Mary Ann Cansino - Page 8




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          Commissioner, 55 T.C. 6, 14 (1970), affd. per curiam 450 F.2d 280           
          (1971).  Thus, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of              
          the 14th Amendment do not operate as a limitation on the taxing             
          power of the Federal Government.  See Hamilton v. Commissioner,             
          68 T.C. 603, 606 (1977).                                                    
               In contrast, the Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment               
          constitutes a limitation on the taxing power of the Federal                 
          Government.  The Due Process Clause provides protection against             
          Federal discriminatory action "so unjustifiable as to be                    
          violative of due process".  Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,              
          642 (1969); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Ward v.            
          Commissioner, 608 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1979), affg. per curiam T.C.           
          Memo. 1979-39. Further, the Due Process Clause of the 5th                   
          Amendment has been held to incorporate guaranties analogous to              
          those of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.  See            
          Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 542 n.2                
          (1983); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975);             
          Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 364-365 n.4 (1974); Bolling v.            
          Sharpe, supra at 499.                                                       
               In evaluating whether a statutory classification violates              
          equal protection, we generally apply a rational basis standard.             
          See Regan v. Taxation With Representation, supra at 547.  We                
          apply a higher standard of review (i.e., strict scrutiny) only if           
          it is found that the statute (1) impermissibly interferes with              






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