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the exercise of a fundamental right, such as freedom of speech,
or (2) employs a suspect classification, such as race. See,
e.g., id.; Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980);
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312
(1976); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
16-17 (1973).
Section 151(e) does not interfere with the exercise of a
fundamental right or employ a suspect classification. See Miller
v. Commissioner, supra (holding that section 151(e) does not
violate the free exercise of religion). Therefore, we need not
apply a higher level of scrutiny, but must decide whether the
statutory SSN requirement of section 151(e) bears a rational
relation to a legitimate governmental purpose. See Regan v.
Taxation With Representation, supra at 547. It is especially
difficult to demonstrate that no rational basis exists for a
classification in a revenue measure for which the presumption
that an act of Congress is constitutional is particularly strong.
See Black v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 505, 507-508 (1977); Nammack
v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1379, 1385 (1971), affd. per curiam 459
F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1972).
It is settled in this Court that the SSN requirement is the
least restrictive means of achieving the Government’s compelling
interests in implementing the Federal tax system in a uniform,
mandatory way and in detecting fraudulent claims to dependency
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