FMC Corporation and Subsidiaries - Page 23




                                       - 23 -                                         
               is zero.  FMC has thus failed to meet its evidentiary                  
               burden of adducing specific facts to evidence                          
               cognizable injury or damage to its shareholders or                     
               itself assertable against Goldman Sachs.  [Id.]                        
          The court then concluded:                                                   
                    A careful consideration of the full record before                 
               the Court in the light most favorable to FMC plainly                   
               shows that:  FMC failed to adduce admissible evidence                  
               of specific facts showing that * * * the price paid by                 
               FMC to its own shareholders for the restructure was                    
               anything other than a fair price established by the                    
               open market;  [Id.]                                                    
          The court reasoned:                                                         
                    An understanding of the essential economic nature                 
               of FMC's recapitalization transaction is crucial to the                
               proper resolution of the issues before the Court.  In                  
               essence, the transaction was intended to increase the                  
               proportion of FMC's equity held by management and to                   
               correspondingly decrease that proportion held by public                
               shareholders.  This would be achieved by returning to                  
               public shareholders, through cash payments, a fraction                 
               of their equity investment in FMC while leaving intact                 
               and unchanged management's equity investment, the                      
               result being, of course, that management would end up                  
               with a larger proportionate share of the reduced total                 
               equity investment in FMC.                                              
                    The transaction would be fair to all parties if                   
               and only if the public shareholders received in cash                   
               the fair value of the equity they were asked to give up                
               measured by open market values.  If they received more                 
               than the fair value of the equity given up, they would                 
               benefit at the cost of management.  If they received                   
               less than the fair value of the equity given up, they                  
               would be disadvantaged to the benefit of management.                   
               FMC's claim suggests that it was harmed because its                    
               shareholders received too much--a remarkable                           
               proposition that was twice soundly rejected by the                     
               District Court in Chicago prior to the transfer to this                
               Court.  As Judge Williams pointed out, "the transaction                
               essentially is an instance of self-dealing" between                    
               management and public shareholders.  FMC Corp. v.                      
               Boesky, 673 F. Supp. 242, 250 (N.D. Ill. 1987).                        






Page:  Previous  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  Next

Last modified: May 25, 2011