FMC Corporation and Subsidiaries - Page 25




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                    The value to FMC of keeping the financial                         
               information confidential until April 2, 1986--allowing                 
               FMC to consummate a recapitalization at $10 per share                  
               less than what eventually proved to be a fair price for                
               the public shareholders' stock--is not a legitimate and                
               legally cognizable value for which FMC may seek legal                  
               recourse.  FMC's insiders were not privileged to                       
               appropriate confidential corporate information for                     
               their own benefit, and to the detriment of public                      
               shareholders.  "Corporate insiders ... have an                         
               obligation to place the shareholder's welfare before                   
               their own...."  Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.                   
               222, 230, 100 S. Ct. 1108, 1115-16, 63 L. Ed. 2d 348                   
               (1980).  [Id. at 633-635 (footnote refs. omitted).4]                   
          A discussion of the value of old FMC stock was also at the heart            
          of the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in           
          FMC Corp. v. Boesky, 36 F.3d 255 (2d Cir. 1994), when it affirmed           
          Judge Pollack’s decision upon appeal.  The Court of Appeals for             




               4 Petitioner argues that Judge Pollack did not find as a               
          fact that the value of old FMC stock was $97 at the time of the             
          recapitalization but simply concluded that petitioner did not               
          provide any admissible evidence to support a lower value.  We do            
          not read this quoted language as narrowly as petitioner.  All the           
          same, the application of collateral estoppel is not precluded               
          simply because a party such as petitioner did not produce all of            
          its evidence in the prior case.  Cory v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d             
          391, 392 (3d Cir. 1947), affirming a Memorandum Opinion of this             
          Court.  Evidence which, by due diligence, could have been                   
          produced in the prior case is considered to have been available             
          at the first case and, to the extent relevant to the issue in               
          dispute, should have been introduced at the time of the prior               
          case.  See Dean v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 895, 900 (1971); Milberg           
          v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1562, 1566 (1970).  In this regard, we             
          reject petitioner’s assertions that Judge Pollack made a                    
          conscious effort to prevent it from presenting any evidence as to           
          the applicable value of the old FMC stock and that he otherwise             
          minimized the probative value of any such evidence by considering           
          it irrelevant to the case before him.                                       






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