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In Kenseth v. Commissioner, supra, we reviewed and
declined to follow the cases relied upon by petitioners,
Cotnam v. Commissioner, supra, and Estate of Clarks v.
United States, supra. We stated as follows:
After further reflection on Cotnam and now
Estate of Clarks v. United States, supra, we
continue to adhere to our holding in O'Brien
that contingent fee agreements, such as the one
we consider here, come within the ambit of the
assignment of income doctrine and do not serve,
for purposes of Federal taxation, to exclude the
fee from the assignor's gross income. We also
decline to decide this case based on the possible
effect of various States' attorney's lien
statutes. [Kenseth v. Commissioner, supra at
412; fn. ref. omitted.]
In Kenseth v. Commissioner, supra, we noted that
there is a disagreement about this issue among the Courts
of Appeals. We reviewed and agreed with Baylin v. United
States, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995), and Alexander v.
Commissioner, 72 F.3d 938 (1st Cir. 1995), affg. T.C. Memo.
1995-51, cases in which the courts had rejected arguments
similar to the argument made by petitioners in the instant
case; see also Young v. Commissioner, 240 F.3d 369 (4th
Cir. 2001), affg. 113 T.C. 152 (1999).
Petitioners acknowledge that the court to which an
appeal of this case lies, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, has rejected their position in Benci-
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