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tion, we found petitioner's testimony to be evasive, uncorrobo-
rated, vague, and/or conclusory in certain material respects.
Under these circumstances, we are not required to, and we shall
not, rely on petitioner's testimony to sustain his burden of
proof in this case. See Lerch v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 624,
631-632 (7th Cir. 1989), affg. T.C. Memo. 1987-295; Geiger v.
Commissioner, 440 F.2d 688, 689-690 (9th Cir. 1971), affg. per
curiam T.C. Memo. 1969-159; Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74,
77 (1986).
As for the documentary evidence on which petitioner relies,
that evidence establishes that petitioner paid certain amounts
for various expenditures. However, except as discussed below,
that documentary evidence does not show that any of those paid
amounts is deductible.
We address initially petitioner’s contention at trial that
he did not file the 1995 return. The only evidence proffered by
petitioner to support that contention is his own self-serving
testimony, on which we are unwilling to rely. Section 6064
provides that “The fact that an individual’s name is signed to a
return * * * shall be prima facie evidence for all purposes that
the return * * * was actually signed by him.” We have found that
the 1995 return was signed in petitioner’s name. On the record
before us, we find that petitioner has failed to overcome the
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