- 7 - The only other evidence petitioner proffered at trial was a summary of the 1988 activity in her personal checking account that she prepared in anticipation of trial, and the testimony of a certified public accountant, Suk L. Lee, who prepared the 1988 Form 1040 that petitioner presented to respondent for purposes of these proceedings. Even if petitioner’s checking account summary and Mr. Lee’s testimony are not rendered inadmissible under the hearsay and best evidence rules, see Fed. R. Evid. 801 and 1001, neither would be probative on the question of whether the payments petitioner received from Bankers Mortgage in 1988 were repayments of loans. On the basis of the record before us, we find that petitioner has failed to carry her burden of proving that respondent’s determination that she received $120,200 of nonemployee compensation in 1988 was erroneous, and we sustain it.5 5 Although sec. 6201(d), as amended by the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. 104-168, sec. 602(a), 110 Stat. 1463 (1996), imposes certain additional evidentiary burdens on the Commissioner where a taxpayer asserts a “reasonable dispute” with respect to an item of income reported on an information return by a third party and the taxpayer has “fully cooperated” with the Commissioner, that section is inapplicable in this case. Sec. 6201(d) was effective as of July 30, 1996. Although the petition in this case was filed on July 22, 1996, the trial was conducted on Apr. 6, 2000. Assuming arguendo (i) that sec. 6201(d) is effective for purposes of this case, and (ii) that petitioner has asserted a “reasonable dispute” concerning the item of income reported on the Form 1099 issued by Bankers Mortgage, sec. 6201(d) would nonetheless be inapplicable because (continued...)Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Next
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