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The only other evidence petitioner proffered at trial was a
summary of the 1988 activity in her personal checking account
that she prepared in anticipation of trial, and the testimony of
a certified public accountant, Suk L. Lee, who prepared the 1988
Form 1040 that petitioner presented to respondent for purposes of
these proceedings. Even if petitioner’s checking account summary
and Mr. Lee’s testimony are not rendered inadmissible under the
hearsay and best evidence rules, see Fed. R. Evid. 801 and 1001,
neither would be probative on the question of whether the
payments petitioner received from Bankers Mortgage in 1988 were
repayments of loans.
On the basis of the record before us, we find that
petitioner has failed to carry her burden of proving that
respondent’s determination that she received $120,200 of
nonemployee compensation in 1988 was erroneous, and we sustain
it.5
5 Although sec. 6201(d), as amended by the Taxpayer Bill of
Rights 2, Pub. L. 104-168, sec. 602(a), 110 Stat. 1463 (1996),
imposes certain additional evidentiary burdens on the
Commissioner where a taxpayer asserts a “reasonable dispute” with
respect to an item of income reported on an information return by
a third party and the taxpayer has “fully cooperated” with the
Commissioner, that section is inapplicable in this case.
Sec. 6201(d) was effective as of July 30, 1996. Although
the petition in this case was filed on July 22, 1996, the trial
was conducted on Apr. 6, 2000. Assuming arguendo (i) that sec.
6201(d) is effective for purposes of this case, and (ii) that
petitioner has asserted a “reasonable dispute” concerning the
item of income reported on the Form 1099 issued by Bankers
Mortgage, sec. 6201(d) would nonetheless be inapplicable because
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