- 19 - litigation costs, the regulations exceed the statutory requirements of section 7430(b)(1). Clearly, the regulations do not impose any such absolute condition, and we have not so held. In 1998, Congress provided under the qualified offer rule of sections 7430(c)(4)(E) and (g) that a taxpayer may be deemed to qualify as a prevailing party under section 7430(a) and (c)(4) regardless of whether the taxpayer substantially prevailed in the proceeding or of whether the position of respondent in the proceeding was substantially justified. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998), Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3101(e)(1) and (2), 112 Stat. 728.5 The qualified offer provisions apparently arose not from any concern with the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies requirement but with the frequent controversy over whether a party qualifies as a prevailing party under section 7430(c)(4)(A). E.g., Corkrey v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 366, 372- 373 (2000); McIntosh v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-144; Gibson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-74; Nguyen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-41; Livingston v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-387 (each of which involves the “no substantial justification” 5 The qualified offer rules of sec. 7430(c)(4)(E) and (g) were made effective for costs incurred after Jan. 22, 1999, 180 days after July 22, 1998. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998), Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3101(g), 112 Stat. 729. Respondent does not contend that any of the litigation costs for which petitioners herein seek recovery were incurred before the Jan. 22, 1999, effective date of the qualified offer rule.Page: Previous 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011