- 20 - requirement of sec. 7430(c)(4)(B)); and Barbour v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-256; Marten v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-186; Johnson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-127; Miller v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-55; Bowden v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-30 (each of which involves the “substantially prevailed” requirement); and Barford v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-26 (involving the net worth requirement of sec. 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii)). Petitioners contend that submission of their qualified offer itself constituted a part of respondent’s administrative process, that their qualified offer demonstrates their good-faith participation in that process, and that at the least with respect to the $39,648 in litigation costs incurred after the date on which they submitted their qualified offer, their earlier failure to ask for an Appeals Office conference should not be fatal. Petitioners have cited no persuasive authority in support of the contention that the existence of their qualified offer makes up for their failure to take advantage of significant administrative remedies available to them, and we have found nothing in the statutory provisions or elsewhere that suggests that the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies requirement is to be regarded as fully satisfied because a taxpayer, 6 weeks before trial, makes a qualified offer. Regardless of whether petitioners’ qualified offer may be regarded as some level of participation by petitioners inPage: Previous 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011