Fred Henry - Page 4




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               In advancing their position in Fabry I, the Fabrys main-               
          tained that injury to business reputation is, as a matter of law,           
          a personal injury within the meaning of section 104(a)(2).  See             
          id. at 309.  We rejected that argument.  See id. at 310-311.                
          Having rejected the Fabrys’ argument that injury to business                
          reputation is, as a matter of law, a personal injury within the             
          meaning of section 104(a)(2), we examined the facts and circum-             
          stances surrounding the $500,000 payment at issue in that case in           
          order to determine whether that payment was made on account of              
          personal injuries, as that term is used in section 104(a)(2).               
          See id. at 311-314.  Based on our examination of all the facts              
          and circumstances surrounding that $500,000 payment, we concluded           
          in Fabry I:                                                                 
                    Since the record of the lawsuit that is before us                 
               does not include any claim for personal injuries within                
               the meaning of section 104(a)(2), we do not believe                    
               that the claim for injury to business reputation was on                
               account of personal injuries, as that term is used in                  
               section 104(a)(2). * * *                                               
          Id. at 314.                                                                 
               The Court of Appeals reversed our decision in Fabry I in               
          Fabry v. Commissioner, 223 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2000) (Fabry II).           
          After reviewing certain case law under section 104(a)(2), the               
          Court of Appeals turned to this Court’s opinion in Fabry I.  The            
          Court of Appeals acknowledged in Fabry II that “The IRS stipu-              
          lated at trial that the $500,000 payment was properly allocable             







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