- 11 - VASQUEZ, J., concurring: While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that we lack jurisdiction under section 6330(d) to review the Commissioner’s determination in this case, see Van Es v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 324, 328-329 (2000), I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s discussion of Meyer v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 417 (2000). In Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. ___ (2001) (Lunsford I), which also was released today, the majority undermined the clear language of section 6330 and the will of Congress by overruling the Court’s holding in Meyer that a taxpayer is entitled to a section 6330 hearing prior to there being a determination upon which this Court’s jurisdiction is predicated. In doing so, the majority in Lunsford I concluded that the hearing statutorily mandated by section 6330(b)(1) is not required prior to our obtaining jurisdiction. Contrary to the majority’s opinion in the instant case, Majority op. p. 9, after Lunsford I, there is nothing left in Meyer for the Court to follow. Therefore, the majority’s discussion of Meyer and stare decisis is unnecessary. Additionally, I disagree with Judge Beghe’s dissent that we should no longer follow our jurisprudence in Moore v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 171 (2000), and Van Es v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 324 (2000). I. Interpreting Section 6330(d) First, Judge Beghe suggests that section 6330(d) is susceptible to the interpretation--indeed, one that he claims isPage: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Next
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