David J. and Jo Dena Johnson - Page 17




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               erratically, but will develop in a principled and                       
               intelligible fashion. * * * While stare decisis is not                  
               an inexorable command, the careful observer will                        
               discern that any detours from the straight path of                      
               stare decisis in our past have occurred for articulable                 
               reasons, and only when the Court has felt obliged “to                   
               bring its opinions into agreement with experience and                   
               with facts newly ascertained.”  * * * every successful                  
               proponent of overruling precedent has borne the heavy                   
               burden of persuading the Court that changes in society                  
               or in the law dictate that the values served by stare                   
               decisis yield in favor of a greater objective. * * *                    
               [Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-266 (1986);                      
               citation omitted.]                                                      
          Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the                
          evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal                 
          principals, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and                      
          contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial            
          process.  Hesselink v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 94, 99 (1991).                  
               A.   Test for Overruling Prior Opinions                                 
               The U.S. Supreme Court has set forth the following four part            
          test for use in determining whether to overrule a prior decision:            
          (1) Whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in                  
          defying practical workability, (2) whether the rule is subject to            
          a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the                 
          consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of                   
          repudiation, (3) whether related principles of law have so far               
          developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of             
          abandoned doctrine, and (4) whether facts have so changed, or                
          come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of            







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