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Section 6330 is susceptible to the interpretation--indeed,
in my view, it’s the preferred reading--that the Tax Court has
jurisdiction under section 6330(d)(1)(A) in all collection cases,
with a district court having concurrent jurisdiction under
section 6330(d)(1)(B) in cases in which the Tax Court lacks
jurisdiction of the underlying tax liability. The delays
encountered in judicial administration of the new collection
1(...continued)
F.2d 159 (8th Cir. 1980) (entire amount received for services
constitutes income); United States v. Richards, 723 F.2d 646, 648
(8th Cir. 1983) (argument that wages and salaries are not income
is “totally lacking in merit”). Petitioners argued they owe no
taxes because “income” is not separately defined in the Internal
Revenue Code, or because the definition of “gross income” in sec.
61 uses the word “income.” Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,
348 U.S. 426, 429-430 (1955) made clear that the language of sec.
61 is entirely appropriate for “Congress to exert in this field
‘the full measure of its taxing power.’” In Liddane v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-259, affd. without published
opinion 208 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2000), and Fox v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1993-277, affd. without published opinion 69 F.3d 543
(9th Cir. 1995), we found these arguments to be frivolous and
imposed a penalty on the taxpayer under sec. 6673(a)(1) for
making them. Petitioners’ syllogism that the Supreme Court
defines income as corporate profit, and that since wages are not
corporate profit he did not have any income, was rejected as
frivolous in Ghalardi Income Tax Educ. Found. v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1998-460. Petitioners’ final argument that a penalty
under sec. 6702(b) cannot be imposed independently of another
penalty because the statute says that “the penalty imposed by
subsection (a) shall be in addition to any other penalty provided
by law” is textually absurd. These frivolous arguments, combined
with the petition to this Court for a redetermination of assessed
frivolous return penalties after written notice from the
Commissioner that the appeal is properly filed in an appropriate
district court, evidence intent to cause unnecessary delay and
expense. In these circumstances, the election to file a petition
in this Court should have been held a waiver of the right of
access to remedies the majority holds we are unable to provide.
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