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constituted “normal” delay in his case and the cause of such
delay. Petitioner’s belief that error in the transmission of
mail caused the petition to arrive on the 100th day--13 days
after the petition was allegedly mailed-–is unfounded. He is
essentially claiming, on the basis of “chance”, and without
evidentiary support, that compounded human errors, including mail
lodged in mail boxes or drop slots and accidental mailing to
Washington State, may have delayed the receipt of his petition by
this Court by 10 days beyond its ordinary delivery time.
Petitioner’s argument, without corroboration, is mere conjecture
and does not meet the criteria established in section 7502 and
its regulations. See sec. 301.7502-1(c)(1)(iii)(b), Proced. &
Admin. Regs.
In the alternative, Mr. Rosenberg argues that because he did
not know that the date could be altered on the T-1000 or how to
alter the date on the T-1000 at the time of the mailing, then he
could not have altered the postage date on the envelope of the
petition; thus, “it was as good as a date stamp at the U.S. Post
Office or by certified mail.” This argument has no basis in the
law. The regulations state the specific criteria that must be
met if a taxpayer does not use a U.S. Postal Service postmark,
and instead chooses to use a private postage meter postmark to
mail and file time-sensitive documents with the Court.
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Last modified: May 25, 2011