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CHIECHI, J., concurring: Respondent chose to ask the Court
to decide the issue of whether the exit fee and the entrance fee
should be capitalized solely on the basis of respondent’s theory
that those fees generated certain significant future benefits for
Metrobank. The majority states that it will “decide this case as
framed by respondent”. Majority op. p. 11. However, the
majority rejects respondent’s reliance on Darlington-Hartsville
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 229 (D.S.C.
1967), affd. 393 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1968), and Rodeway Inns of
America v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 414 (1974),1 because: “The
taxpayer in each of those cases purchased a capital asset
incident to the payment of the expenses in dispute there.”
Majority op. p. 24 note 10. I am concerned that such language by
the majority could be read to suggest its view on what the result
in this case would have been if respondent had argued that the
exit fee and the entrance fee should be capitalized because such
fees constitute amounts expended to acquire an asset with a life
extending substantially beyond the taxable year of acquisition.
See, e.g., Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 13
(1974); Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 575-576 (1970);
Ellis Banking Corp. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 1376, 1379 (11th
Cir. 1982), affg. in part and remanding in part T.C. Memo. 1981-
1On brief, respondent described those two cases as cases in
which “the courts held that the taxpayers could not deduct
expenses that were part of a plan to produce a positive business
benefit for future years.”
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