- 51 -
value of any expected bailout of such member exceeded the present
value of any expected premiums).2
Because petitioner failed to establish Congress’ purpose in
enacting the exit fee requirement, the majority’s conclusions as
to that purpose are not supported by the record. Perhaps
petitioner could have obtained indirect evidence of Congress’
purpose for the exit fee by establishing the rationale behind the
FDIC’s and the Secretary’s decisions in implementing 12 U.S.C.
section 1815(d)(2)(F)(i) (1988) (by promulgating 12 C.F.R. sec.
312.5) (1991).3 Petitioner, however, did not do so. The record,
therefore, contains no evidence from which we could conclude that
the exit fee was collected and expended on petitioner’s behalf
for any benefit (for instance, insurance for the remainder of the
2 The majority may have in mind the exit fee previously
imposed by the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 (CEBA),
Pub. L. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552. See discussion in Majority op.
p. 13. That exit fee, imposed by 12 U.S.C. sec. 1441(f)(4)
(1988), was designed to protect against the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation’s losing insured institutions. See
H. Rept. 100-62, at 42 (1987) (“Some profitable well-capitalized
institutions are considering converting from an institution
insured by FSLIC to an institution insured by FDIC. * * * In
order to reduce the amount of assessments flowing out of FSLIC
during the recapitalization period, the Committee believes it is
necessary to require the payment of a exit fee.”)
3 See, e.g., 55 Fed. Reg. 10406, 10408 (Mar. 21, 1990),
prescribing interim rule for assessment of exit fee and setting
exit fee at 0.90 percent of the deposit base as the “approximate
present value of each SAIF member’s pro rata share of interest
expense on the obligations of the Financing Corporation (“FICO”)
projected over the next thirty years.”
Page: Previous 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011