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Moorhous may not join in challenging the determination letter
issued to petitioner Dorothy Moorhous.
Petitioners also contend that to the extent that
respondent’s determination letter to petitioner Dorothy Moorhous
served as a rejection of petitioners’ joint offer-in-compromise,
petitioner Dudley Moorhous should be permitted to file a petition
challenging the determination letter. Again, petitioners’
argument finds no support in section 6330. Although section
6330(c)(2)(A)(iii) provides that a taxpayer may make an
offer-in-compromise during an Appeals Office hearing, there is no
support for petitioners’ contention that petitioner Dudley
Moorhous should be relieved of the obligation to comply with the
time requirements for filing an Appeals Office hearing pursuant
to section 6330(a). In the end, petitioners’ position begs the
question why petitioner Dudley Moorhous did not timely file a
request for an administrative hearing in response to the notice
of intent to levy issued to him.
As final matter, we reject petitioners’ argument that
respondent’s motion to dismiss is untimely. It is well settled
that questions of jurisdiction may be raised by either party or
the Court sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings. See Smith
v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 10, 13-14 (1991).
Consistent with the preceding discussion, we shall grant
respondent’s motion in that we shall dismiss this case for lack
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