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prescribed for filing the document, (ii) that the delay
in receiving the document was due to a delay in the
transmission of the mail, and (iii) the cause of such
delay.
The validity of this regulation has been upheld. See
Lindemood v. Commissioner, 566 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1977),
affg. T.C. Memo. 1975-195; Fishman v. Commissioner, 420 F.2d 491,
492 (2d Cir. 1970), affg. 51 T.C. 869 (1969).
On the basis of the record presented, we conclude that
petitioners cannot avail themselves of the timely mailing/timely
filing rule set forth in section 301.7502-1(c)(1)(iii)(b),
Proced. & Admin. Regs.
In general, the regulation requires that the petition be
delivered to the Court within the ordinary mailing time for that
class of mail. Petitioners concede that the ordinary delivery
time for an item mailed from Bismark to Washington, D.C., is 3 to
5 days. The petition in this case was delivered to the Court 15
days after it was allegedly mailed. It follows that the petition
was not delivered to the Court within the ordinary mailing time.
Where a petition is mailed to the Court in an envelope
bearing a private postage meter postmark, but the petition is not
delivered to the Court within the ordinary mailing time for that
class of mail, a taxpayer seeking to rely on the timely
mailing/timely filing rule must establish that the petition was
actually deposited in the mail before the expiration of the 90-
day period, that the delay in receiving the petition was due to a
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