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importantly, the facts and circumstances in the record in this
case do not support petitioner’s claim.
First, the language is not supported by the evidence in our
record. We know that all proceeds were not paid on account of
personal injury. Plaintiffs, in their memorandum in support of
the motion for judicial approval, allocated all settlement
proceeds according to back wages, attorney’s fees, and lawsuit
involvement. We find it significant that there was no allocation
for personal injury when the parties to the class action
meticulously provided for all of the items involved in the FLSA
claim. Petitioner dismisses this as a mere technicality. We
cannot so easily ignore this aspect-–especially in light of the
fact that petitioner admits on brief that up to 50 percent of the
proceeds could have been received on account of the FLSA claim.
Second, this language does not show a direct link between
the tort claim and a specific amount of money. It is well
settled that “Failure to show the specific amount of the payment
allocable to the claims of tort or tortlike damages for personal
injuries results in the entire amount’s being presumed not to be
excludable.” Wise v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-4; see also
Jacobs v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-59.
Considering that exclusions from income (including those in
section 104(a)(2)) are narrowly construed, we cannot accept
petitioner’s contentions on this record that the uncorroborated
and equivocal statements in the agreement and release are
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