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grounds are unavailing.
The cases cited by petitioner in support of its position
that the funds were constructively received prior to end of its
fiscal year are not on point. Petitioner cites White v.
Commissioner, 61 T.C. 763 (1974), and Haack v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1981-13, for the proposition that Doyce Gentry’s
unfettered power should be enough to establish constructive
receipt. In both cases, the specific amount of the constructive
recipient’s compensation had been determined in advance through
proper corporate action. In White, the corporation had
determined the amount of the shareholder’s bonus in advance
through a proper corporate resolution and had given him the
power to withdraw the funds whenever he wished. White v.
Commissioner, supra at 764. Similarly, in Haack v.
Commissioner, supra, the bonuses had been awarded to the
controlling shareholder through proper corporate resolutions
prior to the end of the corporation’s fiscal year. This Court
in White and Haack did not address the issue here--whether the
employee would have been in constructive receipt of the
compensation if the corporation had not determined and awarded
the compensation in advance through proper corporate procedures.
Petitioner also cites Fetzer Refrigerator Co. v. United
States, 437 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1971), O.H. Kruse Grain & Milling
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1959-110, affd. 279 F.2d 123 (9th
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